Tag Archives: iaea

International, U.S.

World War 3: The West alone against Iran; 120 countries issue statement supporting Iran

120 countries, members of the Non Aligned Movement (if you haven’t heard of it you can thank your corporate/government controlled mainstream media) have issued a statement of support for Iran’s nuclear program.

In the statement ‘NAM’ stands of Non Aligned Movement, and ‘Agency’ stands for the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency.

Here it is:

Mr. Chairperson,

1- The Vienna Chapter of the Non-Aligned Movement wishes to thank the Director General, Mr. Yukiya Amano, for his report on the Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran as contained in document GOVl2011/65.

2- At the same time, NAM wishes to reaffirm the importance of Director General reports being issued in a timely manner. The late issuance of reports results in Member States having to prepare for meetings of the Board of Governors under significant time constraints.

3- Before expressing its comments on the Director General’s Report, NAM would like to reiterate its principled positions on the matter:
a. NAM reaffirms the basic and inalienable right of all states to the development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in a way as inhibiting or restricting the right of states to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. States’ choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies must be respected.
b. NAM recognizes the IAEA as the sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and stresses that there should be no undue pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, specially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency.
c. NAM emphasizes the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of states in accordance with their respective safeguards agreements, as opposed to any confidence building measures undertaken voluntarily and that do not constitute a legal safeguards obligation.
d. NAM considers the establishment of a nuclear- weapons-free-zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterates its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.
e. NAM reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities -operational or under construction -poses a serious danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and of regulations of the IAEA. NAM recognizes the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
f. NAM strongly believes that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the IAEA framework, and be based on sound technical and legal grounds. NAM further emphasizes that the Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under the Statute of the IAEA.
g. NAM stresses that diplomacy and dialogue through peaceful means as well as substantive negotiations without any preconditions amongst the concerned parties must remain the means whereby a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue is found.

4- NAM stresses that the issue of non-proliferation should be resolved through political and diplomatic means and that measures and initiatives taken in this regard should be within the framework of international law, relevant, conventions and the United Nations Charter.

5- NAM takes note that the Director General has stated once again that the Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran at nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs) as declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement.

6- NAM welcomes the clear distinction made by the Director General between obligations emanating from Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and other requests by the United Nations Security Council. In this regard, NAM notes that the Director General has stated in his report that “Iran is not implementing a number of its obligations” emanating from relevant provisions of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. NAM recalls that the Director General has previously reported Iran’s assertion that some of the Agency’s requests “had no legal basis since they are not falling within Iran’s Safeguards Agreement”, an assertion elaborated by Iran in Document INFCIRC/810 as well. NAM encourages Iran to enhance its cooperation with the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran in accordance with international law.

7- NAM encourages the Secretariat to continue to refrain from including extensive technical details pertaining to sensitive proprietary information in the report of the Director General.

8- NAM welcomes the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran as elaborated in the latest report of the Director General, and in this regard, notes the following:
a. That Iran has declared to the Agency under its Safeguards Agreement, 15 nuclear facilities and 9 LOFs, and that the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at these facilities and LOFs.
b. That the activities of production of nuclear material, particularly those related to enrichment, continue to remain under the Agency’s containment and surveillance and that to date, the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Natanz and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)have been operating as declared.
c. That the Agency has confirmed that the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) corresponded with the design information provided by Iran, that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, and that Iran and the Agency agreed on a safeguards approach for FFEP. The results of the environmental samples taken at FFEP up to 27 April 2011 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium.
d. That the Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran, and confirmed that Iran is not conducting reprocessing activities in any of the facilities declared under its Safeguards Agreement.
e. That Iran has provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency was able to carry out a design information verification (DIV). The Agency verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing, and that the coolant heat exchangers had been installed. According to Iran, the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is planned to commence by the end of 2013.
f. That the Agency also carried out an inspection and a DIV at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP), and confirmed that Iran has started to install some equipment for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) fuel fabrication.

9- NAM notes the standing requests by the Secretariat for further information regarding the design and scheduling of the construction of new nuclear facilities, and continues to encourage Iran to provide design information regarding its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency.

10- NAM notes that the Director General mentioned in his report that he reiterated to Iran his position regarding the need to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other relevant obligations, in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. NAM recalls that Iran responded by extending an invitation to the Deputy Director General for Safeguards to visit its nuclear facilities and that the question of the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program was discussed during that visit. NAM welcomes such invitations, and that Iran as a confidence building measure, has provided the Agency during the visit with access to:
a. An installation where research and development (R & D) on advanced centrifuges was taking place, as well as extensive information on its current and future R & D work on advanced centrifuges.
b. The Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) for the first time since 2005, at which time the Agency observed that the HWPP was operating.

11- While noting the DG’s concern regarding the issue of possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program, NAM also notes that Iran has still not received the documents relating to the “alleged studies”. In this context, NAM fully supports the previous requests of the Director General to those Members States that have provided the Secretariat information related to the “alleged studies” to agree that the Agency provides all related documents to Iran. NAM expresses once again its concerns on the creation of obstacles in this regard, which hinder the Agency’s verification process. NAM recalls that the Director General previously reported in document GOV/2009/55 that:
a. The Agency has limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that forms the basis of the alleged studies.
b. The constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information to Iran are making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on this matter.

12- In light of the aforementioned obstacles, NAM requests further clarification on the methodology adopted by the Agency in arriving at its assessment as contained in paragraph 42 of the report.

13- NAM welcomes the will of Iran “to remove ambiguities, if any”, as well as its suggestion that the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG) should visit Iran for discussions aiming at the resolution of matters. NAM notes the reply by the Director General, indicating his preparedness to send the DDG-SG to “discuss the issues identified” in his report to the Board of Governors. In this context, NAM welcomes the continuation of this positive dialogue and cooperation between Iran and the Agency.

14- NAM requests clarification from the Agency for not incorporating Iran’s comments on all the new information in this report prior to its official release.

15- Bearing in mind the Agency’s responsibility in protecting safeguards confidential information, NAM remains concerned by recurring incidents of leakage of such information that, in the absence of adequate corrective measures by the Agency, calls into question the credibility of its regime for the protection of safeguards confidential information.

16- NAM welcomes Iran’s resolve to continue cooperating with the Agency, and still looks forward to the safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner. In this context, NAM encourages the Agency and Iran to continue engaging substantively without delay for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding the issues identified in the report, with a view to the prompt resolution of these issues in accordance with the Work Plan on “Understanding of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency on the Modalities of resolution of the Outstanding Issues” (INFCIRC/711).

17- NAM reiterates its principled position that diplomacy and dialogue are the only way for a long term solution of Iran’s nuclear issue. NAM encourages all Member States to contribute positively to that effect.

18- Before concluding, NAM wishes to express its deep concern and dissatisfaction at the selective circulation of the Director General’s report, or parts thereof, to certain Member States prior to its official release to all Member States. This runs counter to the principle of the sovereign equality of all Member States enshrined in the IAEA Statute and should not be repeated in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

 

International, Technology, U.S.

World War 3: Russia blasts IAEA, backs Iran

“Russia is gravely disappointed and bewildered that the report is being turned into a source adding to the tensions over the problems connected to the Iranian nuclear program.”-Russian Foreign Ministry

Russia has doubts concerning the IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program.  One clue is that the report wasn’t supposed to be made public until November 17/18.  It seems IAEA boss Yukiya Amano intentionally ‘leaked’ the report on November 8: “We have serious doubts about the justification for steps to reveal contents of the report to a broad public, primarily because it is precisely now that certain chances for the renewal of dialogue between the ‘sextet’ (P5+1) of international mediators and Tehran have begun to appear.”-Russian Foreign Ministry

Russian officials say this is an intentional move made behind the scenes by the United States: “The analysis must take place in a calm atmosphere, since it is important to determine whether some new, reliable evidence strengthening suspicions of a military element in Iran’s nuclear program has really appeared, or whether we are talking about an intentional, and counterproductive, whipping up of emotions.”

Business/Economics, International, Technology, U.S.

World War 3: Iran responds to IAEA claims

On November 8, Iran’s envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali-Asghar Soltanieh, answered 20 critical questions about Iran’s nuclear program.

Question 1: Has the IAEA detected, after 4000 days of most intensive inspection in the agency’s history, even one gram of uranium being diverted for military purposes?

Response: No. Please study all of the reports by the agency’s current and former director generals.

Question 2: With respect to nuclear activities and materials which are claimed to have not been declared until 2003, has the IAEA found out that they had been diverted towards military activities?

Response: No. All of these activities and materials were audited by the agency. Please study all the agency’s reports to the Board of Governors between 2003 and 2004

Question 3: Was Iran ethically obliged to declare Natanz enrichment facility before 2003?

Response: No. Given that nuclear material had not been introduced into the facility until 2003, Iran was under no obligations to declare it. Particularly since Iran had not signed the Revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements, as well as the additional Comprehensive Safeguards (CSA) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agreements.

Question 4: Was Iran legally obliged to declare the heavy water research reactor in Arak (IR40) before 2003?

Response: No. Iran was not under any obligation to declare it since no nuclear material had been introduced into it until 2003, particularly since Iran had not signed the Revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements until 2003.

Question 5: Had Iran any obligation under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to report Arak’s heavy water production plant to the IAEA before 2003?

Response: No, because heavy water and its products are not covered by the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Iran started implementing the Additional Protocol in 2003.

Question 6: Was Iran under any legal obligation until 2003 to declare uranium conversion Facilities (UCF)?

Response: No. Since no nuclear material had been introduced into the facility until 2003, Iran was not under any obligations to declare it, particularly given that Iran had not signed the Revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements until 2003.

Question 7: Did Iran have any legal obligation to declare uranium mines including Gachin and Saghand mines?

Response: No, because Iran had not signed and implemented the Additional Protocol until 2003.

Question 8: Has the IAEA detected any nuclear material or activity including enrichment in Parchin and Lavizan-Shian, which are claimed to have been part of a nuclear weapons program after the UN agency carried out intensive inspections, including sampling and analyzing?

Response: No. The director general’s press statement about Iran on March 6, 2006 reads, “On transparency, I think I mentioned in my report access to military sites, we have been given access to a number of military sites recently, to Parchin, Lavizan, Shian, to dual use equipment, to interview people. These are beyond the Additional Protocol, but they are essential for us to reconstruct the history of the program.”

On November 15, 2004, the director general reported that the agency had been provided access to the Lavizan-Shian military site where the agency took environmental samples. Finally, paragraph 102 of the director general (GOV/2004/83) says, “The vegetation and soil samples collected from the Lavizan-Shian site have been analyzed, and reveal no evidence of nuclear material.” Further information with respect to this issue is available in November 18, 2005 (GOV/2005/87) and February 27, 2006 (GOV/2006/15) documents.

Question 9: Did the IAEA, in its agreed Action Plan (INFOSIRC/711), announce that there is no other issue in addition to what was listed in 2007?

Response: Yes. The paragraph IV of the document (INFOSIRC/711) says that these modalities cover all the remaining issues, and the agency emphasizes that there will be no issues and ambiguities regarding Iran’s previous nuclear programs and activities.

Question 10: Was the IAEA bound to submit the documents related to the “Alleged Studies” to the Islamic Republic based on its Action Plan?

Response: Yes. Paragraph III says, “Although the agency will submit the documents to the Islamic Republic, considering the Green Salt Project, experiments of high explosives and carrying missiles with returning abilities, it will also keep them with itself.

Question 11: Did the IAEA fulfill its obligations regarding the submitting of the evidence pertaining to the allegations to Iran?

Response: No. Please study the report by the former director general to the UN Board of Governors, where he correctly criticizes that the certain country that has provided the agency with the evidence on the allegations has not allowed the agency to submit the documents in question to Iran.

Question 12: Has the IAEA confirmed the authenticity of the content of the “Alleged Studies”?

Response: No. Please study the report by the former director general to the UN Board of Governors, where he correctly brought up the authentic problems with the documents. The director general also clearly explained that the nuclear materials and activities in the “Alleged Studies” are not relevant.

Question 13: What was Iran’s obligation toward the document INFOSIRC/ 711 regarding the “Alleged Studies”?

Response: In Paragraph III of the document, which was discussed and agreed upon by the IAEA and Iran, and was to be approved by the Board of Governors specifies, “As a sign of the resolve to cooperate with the agency, based on all the related documents received, Iran will study the document and will inform the agency of its evaluation.”

Question 14: Did Iran, under the work plan, have any obligation to hold meetings, interviews or [allow] sampling regarding the “Alleged Studies”?

Response: No. As mentioned in Response 12, Iran was only obliged to inform of its evaluation. Iran has submitted its 117-page evaluation of the past three years. But the agency has not acted on its obligation to end the Action Plan. Accreting to Paragraph IV of the Action Plan, “The agency and Iran agreed that, following the implementation of the Action Plan and the agreed modalities for the negotiation of remaining issues, the implementation of the safeguards in Iran change to continue in the normal and conventional path.”

Notice: Instead of the Action Plan’s conclusion, the secretariat introduced new allegations known as “Possible Military Aspects.” But in Paragraph IV of the Work Plan it is affirmed that “no issue has remained and there not any doubts about Iran’s nuclear program and previous activities.”

Question 15: Has the Islamic Republic implemented the Additional Protocol?

Response: Yes. Please study the report by the former director general before 2006.

Question 16: Has Iran implemented the Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement?

Response: Yes. Please study the report by the former director general before 2006.

Question 17: Since when Iran has halted its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and the Modified Code 3.1? Why?

Response: Iran’s Majlis (parliament) voted to stop the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and the Modified Code 3.1 (after two years and half) regarding the unfair reference of Iran’s technical nuclear case to the United Nations Security Council in 2006. The important point is that the Additional Protocol is not a binding legal tool and the Modified Code 3.1 was merely a suggestion by the Board of Governors and is not part of the legal provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA).

Question 18: Have all Iran’s nuclear materials been measured, and are under the complete supervision of the safeguards and remained peaceful?

Response: Yes. Please study the annual Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR).

Question 19: Did Iran itself provide the possibility of unannounced inspections?

Response: Yes. The agency conducted more than 100 unannounced inspections in Iran. The advance-notice for some of them were issued only two hours before the inspection.

Question 20: Why does Iran deem the resolutions by the Board of Governors and the UN Security Council as illegal?

Response: A. In accordance with Article 12 C under the IAEA statute, if the inspectors notice any “non-compliance,” they should report the same to the director general and the later should report to the Board of Governors thereafter. Followingly, the Board will notify the report to the United Nations. None of these procedures have been applied with regard to Iran.

After three years elapsed since 2003, when the issue was raised at the Board of Governors, some members of the Board claimed that there had been “non-compliance” prior to 2003. Nonetheless, the director general did not use the legal term “non-compliance” and instead used the word “failure,” which has also been used with regard to the other countries, which implement the CSA. Based on this agreement, the issue will be considered as concluded after corrective measures are adopted. The former director general clearly confirmed in his report that Iran took all the corrective measures.

B. Article 12 C mentioned in the Board’s resolutions speak of “recipient member states,” which have misused the nuclear materials delivered from the Agency. Iran has never received the nuclear materials mentioned in the relevant provisions under the Statute.

C. According to the Statute and the CSA, if the Agency discovers that the nuclear materials have been diverted to military purposes, it will notify the UN Security Council of the same. All the reports submitted by the incumbent and former dire generals so far contain no evidence of nuclear diversion.

D. Based on the CSA, if a member state does not allow the inspectors to enter the country and as a result the IAEA cannot conduct its verification activities, the Agency will notify the UN Security Council of the issue. All the reports by the director general since 2003 have explicitly announced that the Agency is able to continue its verification activities in Iran.

E. The resolutions by three EU member states against Iran from 2003 to 2006 have recognized Iran’s move to suspend its uranium enrichment activities as a non-binding, voluntary and trust-building measure. Therefore, the Board of Governors ‘s resolutions which referred Iran’s nuclear issue to the UN Security Council, after Iran decided to suspend its UCF activities voluntarily, are totally in contradiction with the Board’s previous resolutions.

It should be mentioned that when the three EU member states proposed the anti-Iran resolutions at the Board of Governors in 2006 with political motives and in an attempt to involve the UN Security Council in an IAEA-related technical issue, enrichment activities in Natanz were still suspended voluntarily.

The last question from peace-seeking nations:

Based on the above mentioned facts, should we allow the IAEA, as the only international body tasked with promotion of peaceful use of nuclear energy for the achievement of peace and prosperity, to be manipulated as a tool by a number of countries which seek to turn the Agency into a watchdog utterly malleable into the hands of the UN Security Council and deprive the developing countries of their “absolute right” to use peaceful nuclear energy as stipulated in the IAEA Statute?

International, Technology, U.S.

World War 3: IAEA accuses Iran of trying to make nuclear weapons, get ready for another U.S. led invasion

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report says Iran has built test sites for nuclear weapons.

The IAEA says Iran conducted high explosives testing aimed at simulating the detonation of nuclear weapons.  Iran is also accused of conducting research that is relevant only to nuclear weapons.

IAEA officials are demanding Iran provide an explanation.

Iranian officials say the IAEA is being directly manipulated by the United States.  Iran claims the current director of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano of Japan, is simply reading from a report that was made up by U.S. officials, and is baseless.

 

International, Technology, U.S.

World War 3: Ron Paul says U.S. claims against Iran are overblown, sanctions are acts of war

“For them to be a threat to us and to anyone in the region, I think it’s blown out of proportion.”-Ron Paul, U.S. Congressman from Texas

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is scheduled to come out on November 8 with a new report on Iran.  Some sources say it will accuse Iran of making nuclear weapons.

One week ago, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee asked to intensify sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Ron Paul says that proves we are at war with Iran: “When you put on strong sanctions, those are acts of war.”

If you take some college courses on warfare you’ll discover that economic sanctions really are part of the war making arsenal (that’s why the Japanese say they were justified in attacking the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor in 1941).